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Abstract: We study three triggers of conflict and explore their resultant emotional reactions in a
laboratory experiment. Economists suggest that the primary trigger of conflict is monetary incentives.
Social psychologists suggest that conflicts are often triggered by fear. Finally, evolutionary biologists
suggest that a third trigger is uncertainty about an opponent’s desire to cause harm. Consistent with
the predictions from economics, social psychology, and evolutionary biology, we find that conflict
originates from all three triggers. The three triggers differently impact the frequency of conflict,
but not the intensity. Also, we find that the frequency and intensity of conflict decrease positive
emotions and increase negative emotions and that conflict impacts negative emotions more than
positive emotions.
Keywords: conflict; incentives; fear; uncertainty; laboratory experiment; reverse dictator game; joy of
destruction game
1. Introduction
The study of human conflict is old. Hobbes wrote in the 17th Century that “the condition
of Man . . . is a condition of Warre (sic) of everyone against everyone” [1]. The occurrence of
human conflict is older. Fatal conflict between warring hunter-gatherers in West Turkana, Kenya
occurred around 9700 BCE [2], but was likely a regular part of life thousands of years earlier [3].
Its ubiquity, coupled with the emotions experienced by those involved, makes human conflict a regular
topic of discussion in the social and natural sciences—especially economics, social psychology, and
evolutionary biology.
There is no dearth of empirical research on conflict and emotions in the aggregated body of
economics, social psychology, and evolutionary biology research. However, little empirical work exists
about the “triggers” of conflict and their accompanying emotions. Like focusing only on the second
and third acts of a three-act play, most conflict management research focuses on conflict dynamics that
are mature or already entrenched among warring parties. Studying the first act of conflict—i.e., what
triggers it in the first place—may complement our understanding of conflict dynamics and provide
practical insights into how to avoid a conflict from progressing to acts two and three.
Conflict may be defined as a situation in which agents choose adversarial costly inputs that
(i) negatively impact the payoff of others and (ii) generate no positive externalities for third parties [4].
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Economists, social psychologists, and evolutionary biologists emphasize different triggers of conflict.
A triggered conflict subsequently produces an emotional reaction—a neurological response—which
may result in physical and psychological changes aggravating individual behavior and leading to an
even more severe conflict. The current study examines the interplay between the triggers of conflict
and emotional reactions—a gap yet to be addressed across the economic, social psychology, and
evolutionary biology literatures.
The purpose of our study is to systematically examine potential triggers of conflict and resultant
emotional reactions in a controlled laboratory setting where individuals may engage in destructive
activities. Our study makes a priori predictions about the triggers of conflict and explores the
resultant emotions post hoc. Consistent with the predictions from economics, social psychology,
and evolutionary biology, conflict emerges when there are economic incentives, fear of an opponent’s
behavior, and uncertainty about an opponent’s desire to cause harm. Further, the three triggers
differently impact the frequency of conflict, but not the intensity. Also, we find that the frequency and
intensity of conflict decrease positive emotions and increase negative emotions. Finally, we find that
conflict impacts negative emotions more than positive emotions.
2. Theoretical Background
2.1. The Economic Perspective on Conflict
The primary trigger of conflict studies by economists is monetary incentives. Economics research
finds that economic agents engage in conflicts when such conflicts bring positive expected returns,
often in the form of monetary rewards [5–7]. However, ultimately, conflict expenditures are wasteful
and agents would be better off if they did not engage in such conflicts [8–12].
The economic perspective on conflict maintains that as individuals have greater incentive to incite
conflict, conflict will emerge [13]. Francisco Pizarro’s conquest of the Incan Empire was primarily
motivated by the incentives of gold and political power [14]. A more recent example of incentives
inciting conflict is the Iraq–Kuwait War that emerged from a multi-billion dollar debt pressure on Iraq
from a previous war coupled with Kuwait’s competitive petroleum prices against Iraq’s [15].
2.2. The Social Psychological Perspective on Conflict
The broad field of social psychology presents several triggers for conflict, including status
seeking [16], greed [17], and fear. We focus on the trigger that has received considerable attention:
fear in what others can and will do to cause harm [18]. A body of work that has examined the role of
fear in conflict extensively is about social dilemmas. Social dilemmas are interdependent decisions
where individual rationality aggregates to collective irrationality and ruin [19]. A social dilemma
that captures the essence of conflict incited by fear is the Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” [20].
On a commons meadow, shepherds may graze as many animals of their own herd as wanted for
fattening and later sale. The benefits of a fatter animal are internalized to the focal shepherd, while
the costs of fattening the animal are spread across the other shepherds. Because the benefits enjoyed
by the shepherd is greater than his costs, it is rational for the shepherd to place as many animals on
the commons as possible. The common risks collapse when all (or enough) shepherds add as many
animals as they can. Hardin [21] went on to suggest that even those not opportunistic would oblige to
place their entire herd on the commons today in fear that the grass will be gone tomorrow.
The fear that others will opportunistically incite conflict is a powerful motivator to defensively
incite conflict [22,23]. Indeed, empirical work on social dilemmas finds that an individual’s fear of
another’s exploitation motivates conflict defensively [24–27]. The Cold War is often considered a
classic example of conflict incited by paranoia between political leaders and among neighbors [28].
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2.3. The Evolutionary Biology Perspective on Conflict
Evolutionary biologists suggest that the third trigger of conflicts is uncertainty about an
opponent’s ability and desire to cause harm [29]. Thus, whereas social psychologists are interested
in the uncertainty (or fear) of another party’s intentions, evolutionary biologists are interested in the
uncertainty of an opponent’s ability and desire to win a conflict. When there is perfect information and
the costs of conflict are relatively high, settlements are likely to occur according to certain asymmetries
between the contestants [30,31]. However, when there is uncertainty and differences are hard to detect,
conflicts are more likely to ensue as the contestants uncover who is stronger (or more aggressive) and
who is weaker [32,33].
It is well-documented that animals use different signals, evolutionarily designed to reduce
uncertainty about an opponent’s strength, to demonstrate their strength as well as their desire to engage
in contests. For example, crickets use songs to signal their ability to win an aggressive contest [34].
Wood warblers use low-amplitude songs to signal their desire to attack their opponents [35]. Moreover,
such signaling actions are more likely to take place when contests can be avoided [36], suggesting
that concealing actions (thus increasing uncertainty about an opponent’s desire to cause harm) could
lead to higher frequency of conflict. A historical example of humans using signals of their desire
and capability to fight is the Ma¯ori’s use of the Haka dance—the peruperu—when they encountered
hostile tribes and unwelcome European explorers [37]. A modern example is warring street gangs
who brandishing their weapons to signal their desire and capability to defend their turf [38].
3. Methods
3.1. Experimental Design
To test how monetary incentives, fear, and uncertainty trigger conflict, we conduct a simple
laboratory experiment. The experimental sessions were conducted in the Experimental Social Science
Laboratory (ESSL) at the University of California, Irvine. Participants were seated at one of forty
networked computer terminals and separated by privacy screens. All interactions were anonymous
and took place through the computer terminals using the software package z-Tree [39]. Participants
were recruited via email announcement. Each subject participated in only one session, and had not
previously participated in a similar experiment. In addition to the earnings from the experiment, each
participant received a US$7 payment for showing up on time. There were 310 participants in total.
A participant’s total earnings was the sum of the two payments. On average, the participants received
$14.90 for approximately 40 min of participation. Earnings were paid in cash, privately, at the end of
the session.
The experiment consisted of three parts (for detail instructions see the Appendix A). Participants
were told that there will be three parts to the experiment and that they would receive a payoff from
each part, but they only received instructions for each part one at a time (after completing a preceding
part). In the first part, participants had the opportunity to earn a lump-sum payment by correctly
solving math problems. The task entailed repeatedly adding sequences of five randomly generated
two-digit numbers over the course of 10 min [40]. This is an appealing real-effort task because it
does not require previous experience and high performance is not associated with a particular gender,
socioeconomic background, or physical conditioning [41]. Any participant that correctly answered at
least X = 3 such sequences, where X was unknown to the participants but known to be achievable,
received the payment. The purpose of the task was to create a sense of ownership over the lump-sum
payment, while making sure that all participants worked as hard as possible (since X was unknown to
them) and could successfully complete the task (since X = 3 was a very low threshold). The task has
been previously used by Price and Sheremeta [42]. They showed that using an uncertain threshold
elicits similar effort from participants as a piece-rate (ensuring that all participants work as hard as
possible), yet it results in equal payments to all participants.
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Second, participants stated their preferences over five pairs of paintings and were divided into two
equal groups based upon these stated preferences [43]. Each pair consisted of one painting by Wassily
Kandinsky and one painting by Paul Klee. To make the division, we rank-ordered the participants
based on the number of Kandinsky paintings they prefer (ties broken randomly), assigning those
participants above the median to the Kandinsky group, and those participants below the median to
the Klee group. The grouping created a sense, albeit weak, of group identity, which is the natural case
in conflict situations. Lastly, each participant from the Kandinsky group was randomly matched with
a participant from the Klee group for a one-shot game.
Third, participants participated in one of the four treatments, see Table 1. Our treatments were
based on the modified “Joy of Destruction” game [44,45] and a “Reverse Dictator” game [46,47].
Table 1. Summary of treatments.
Treatment Description of Treatment Number of Participants Number of Independent Observations
Baseline Sender can pay $1 to destroy between $1 and $10 86 43
Fear Both Sender and Receiver can destroy money 56 56
Information There is a chance that Nature destroys some money 82 41
Incentive Sender gets to keep whatever he/she chooses to destroy 86 43
In the Baseline treatment, after earning $10 in the effort task, one participant in each pair was
assigned the Sender role and the other participant was assigned the Receiver role. The Sender had
an option to pay $1 to reduce the Receiver’s earnings (i.e., “destroy” the Receiver’s money). If the
Sender opted to pay the $1 fee, the Sender then decided how much of the Receiver’s earnings to
destroy. Any whole dollar amount between $1 and $10 could be selected. The Receiver then learned
the Sender’s decisions.
In the Uncertainty treatment, procedures were similar to the Baseline treatment; however, there
was a one-third chance that “nature” would destroy some money (any amount between $1 and $10
was equally likely to be destroyed). Realized destruction was the maximum of the Sender’s selection
and nature’s selection. The Receiver learned the amount destroyed, but not the cause of the damage.
In the Fear treatment, procedures were similar to the Baseline treatment. However, both
participants in each pair were simultaneously Sender and Receiver: both participants simultaneously
made their decisions to destroy after paying a fee, and each faced the threat of destruction.
In the Incentive treatment, Senders kept whatever they choose to destroy but still had to pay the
$1 fee. Receivers were aware that the Sender kept whatever they destroyed.
There are several differences between our experiment and previous ones [44–47]. First,
we incorporate group identity via the preference elicitation procedure, which allows us to create
a natural conflict environment. Second, we consider different possible triggers of conflict, thereby
identifying whether each does indeed trigger conflict. Finally, all our treatments include a destruction
fee, allowing us to provide a systematic comparison between treatments.
3.2. Assessment of Emotions
To understand how conflict decisions trigger emotional reactions, we issued Watson et al.’s [48]
well-established and validated PANAS (positive and negative affect scales) survey to uncover
twenty emotional states of the participants post their resource allocation decision. The survey
was conducted right after participants received feedback about the outcome from part three of the
experiment. Of the twenty emotional states, nine are classified as positive (appreciative, happy,
content, cheerful, triumphant, inspired, secure, proud, and believable) and ten are classified as negative
(disgusted, jealous, aggravated, frustrated, angry, depressed, sad, embarrassed, ashamed, and guilty).
The emotional state, surprise, could be either positive or negative, so we exclude it from our analysis.
Following Schniter et al. [49], we create two categorical variables corresponding to a valence
positive–negative perspective of emotional reactions. Of course, more sophisticated categorization of
emotions could be used, such as the one following the recalibration perspective [50,51]; for applications,
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see Schniter and Shields [52] and Schniter and Sheremeta [53]. However, for our purpose, the
positive–negative categorization is sufficient.
3.3. Control Variables
Lastly, at the end of the experiment, we elicited various demographic information to assess their
impact on conflict frequency and amount destroyed. The control variables included race, religion, level
of religious activity, gender, age, level in higher education, degree major, and the number of courses
taken in business and economics.
4. Results
4.1. Frequency and Intensity of Conflict
Figure 1 and the first column in Table 2 show the average frequency of conflict, measured as the
frequency of destruction amount being positive, by treatment. In the Baseline treatment, the frequency
of conflict is 7%, with only three out of 43 participants choosing to destroy any amount. The frequency
of conflict in the Fear treatment is 18% (10/56) or 11% higher than in the Baseline treatment (z-test
of proportions, p = 0.056, n1 = 43, n2 = 56). The frequency of conflict in the Uncertainty treatment
is 20% (8/41), also higher (by 13%) than in the Baseline treatment (z-test of proportions, p = 0.044,
n1 = 43, n2 = 41). Finally, the frequency of conflict in the Incentive treatment is 72% (31/43) and is 63%
higher than in the Baseline treatment (z-test of proportions, p < 0.001, n1 = 43, n2 = 43). It is likely
that the frequency of conflict is the highest in the Incentive treatment because senders get to keep
whatever they choose to destroy (in other words, senders steal the spoils of conflict instead of just
destroying resources).
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Table 2. The average frequency of conflict and amount of destruction by treatment.
Treatment
Frequency of Conflict Amount Destroyed Amount Destroyed Under Conflict
Mean N Mean N Mean N
Baseline 0.07 (0.04) 43 $0.44 (0.27) 43 $6.33 (1.86) 3
Fear 0.18 (0.05) 56 $1.04 (0.36) 56 $5.80 (1.14) 10
Uncertainty 0.20 (0.06) 41 $1.20 (0.45) 41 $6.13 (1.23) 8
Incentive 0.72 (0.07) 43 $4.28 (0.58) 43 $5.94 (0.57) 31
Note: Standard error of the mean is in the parenthesis. Amount destroyed under conflict is calculated by using only
those observations that resulted in a positive amount of destruction.
Next, we examine the intensity of conflict. The middle column in Table 2 shows the average
amount destroyed by treatment. In the Baseline treatment, the average amount destroyed is $0.44, in
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the Fear treatment it is $1.04, in the Uncertainty treatment it is $1.20, and in the Incentive treatment
it is $4.28. When comparing against the Baseline treatment, we find that the amount destroyed is
not statistically different in either the Fear treatment (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.121, n1 = 43,
n2 = 56) or the Uncertainty treatment (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.092, n1 = 43, n2 = 41), but it
is significantly higher in the Incentive treatment (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value < 0.001, n1 = 43,
n2 = 43). It is possible, however, that the differences in the Incentive treatment are mainly due to the
differences in the frequency of conflict. Indeed, when examining the amount destroyed conditional on
the destruction amount being positive (see the last column in Table 2), we find no significant difference
in the average amount destroyed among the four treatments: $6.33 in the Baseline treatment, $5.80 in
the Fear treatment, $6.13 in the Uncertainty treatment, and $5.94 in the Incentive treatment. Based on the
Wilcoxon rank-sum test, all p-values are greater than 0.500.
In summary, consistent with the predictions from economics, social psychology, and evolutionary
biology, conflicts originate when there are economic incentives (the Incentive treatment), fear (the
Fear treatment) or uncertainty (the Uncertainty treatment). Also, all three triggers differently impact
the frequency of conflict, but not the intensity. It is important to emphasize that direct comparison
among our treatments should be done with caution, since our results could be sensitive to the specific
parameters that were selected for each treatment. For example, it could be the case that the Uncertainty
treatment would result in more conflict if the chance of “nature” destroying money was one-half
instead of one-third. Similarly, the Incentive treatment could have resulted in less conflict if, instead of
keeping all that Senders chose to destroy, they could keep only part of it.
4.2. Emotions Resulting from Conflict Decisions
Recall that right after participants engaged in a conflict and received feedback about the outcome
of the conflict, we elicited their emotional responses using the PANAS (positive and negative affect
scales) survey to uncover twenty emotional states of the participants. Based on these responses, we
create two variables: the Positive Emotion (the average of all positive emotions, Cronbach’s α = 0.905)
and Negative Emotion (the average of all negative emotions, Cronbach’s α = 0.887). Next, we examine
how different triggers of conflict impact emotional reactions of participants.
Table 3 reports the estimation results of regressions by treatment in which the dependent variable
is either Conflict (i.e., whether a participant chose to destroy any amount or not) or Amount Destroyed
(i.e., the amount that a participant chose to destroy), and the independent variables are both Positive
Emotion and Negative Emotion. When Conflict is a dependent variable, we use Probit regressions, and
when Amount Destroyed is a dependent variable we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions.
Table 3. Conflict decisions and emotional reactions.
Treatment Baseline Fear Uncertainty Incentive
Conflict
Positive Emotion −1.07 *** −0.09 −0.17 −0.10
(the average of all positive emotions) (0.35) (0.21) (0.22) (0.24)
Negative Emotion 1.73 *** 0.57 ** 0.12 5.81 **
(the average of all negative emotions) (0.56) (0.29) (0.37) (2.43)
Constant −1.42 −1.62 * −0.64 −5.88 **
(constant term) (0.94) (0.96) (0.83) (2.66)
Amount Destroyed
Positive Emotion −0.40 0.36 −0.03 −0.02
(the average of all positive emotions) (0.32) (0.27) (0.38) (0.56)
Negative Emotion 1.18 1.48 ** 0.73 3.41 ***
(the average of all negative emotions) (0.86) (0.71) (1.07) (1.11)
Constant 0.19 −2.21 0.33 −0.33
(constant term) (1.63) (1.41) (1.90) (2.30)
Note: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Robust standard error of the mean is in the
parenthesis. When Conflict is a dependent variable, we use Probit regressions, and when Amount Destroyed is a
dependent variable we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions.
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The estimation results in Table 3 show that the frequency of conflict is negatively correlated with
positive emotions and positively correlated with negative ones. Specifically, when the dependent
variable is Conflict, the coefficient on Positive Emotion in all four treatments is negative and jointly
significant (Wald test, p = 0.005) and the coefficient on Negative Emotion in all four treatments is positive
and jointly significant (Wald test, p = 0.001). Although the relative magnitude of coefficients is different
across treatments, we are hesitant to make between-treatments comparisons. The hesitancy is because
our results could be sensitive to the specific parameters that were selected for each treatment. Therefore,
we focus on a “general trend” of emotional reactions across treatments rather than a specific one.
Another general observation from Table 3 is that the frequency of conflict has a greater impact
on negative emotions than on positive ones. When the dependent variable is Conflict, the absolute
value of the coefficient on Negative Emotion is greater than on Positive Emotion in all four treatments.
Moreover, jointly across treatments, this difference is significant (Wald test, p = 0.007).
Next, we examine how the intensity of conflict impacted emotional reactions. Table 3 reports
that when the dependent variable is Amount Destroyed, the coefficient on Positive Emotion is negative
in three treatments but it is not significant (Wald test, p = 0.910). The coefficient on Negative Emotion
is negative in all four treatments and jointly significant (Wald test, p = 0.001). As with the frequency
of conflict, the intensity of conflict has a greater impact on negative emotions than on positive ones.
When the dependent variable is Amount Destroyed, the absolute value of the coefficient on Negative
Emotion is greater than on Positive Emotion in all four treatments. Moreover, jointly across treatments,
this difference is significant (Wald test, p = 0.004).
In summary, the frequency and intensity of conflict decreases positive emotions and increases
negative emotions. Also, the regression estimation results point out that conflict impacts negative
emotions more than positive emotions.
4.3. Effect of Demographics on Conflict Decisions
The regression analysis including our control variables is reported in Table 4. The first regression
is a Probit regression in which the dependent variable is Conflict and the independent variables are
treatment dummies as well as demographics. The second regression is an OLS regression in which the
dependent variable is Amount Destroyed.
Controlling for demographic differences, we find that the Incentive treatment is the strongest
practical predictor of destruction decisions, yielding a 54.3% increase in the likelihood of destruction
(based on the estimated marginal effects) and a $4.01 increase in the average (unconditional) level of
destruction. Also, we find that the Fear treatment increases the likelihood of destruction by 12.3% and
the Uncertainty treatment increases it by 17.1%. The only demographic characteristic that is statistically
significant at the 5% level is Age, with older participants exerting lower frequency and magnitude of
conflict. However, it is important to emphasize that almost 90% of our participants are between the
age of 18 and 22, making it difficult to make general conclusions about how age impacts the frequency
and magnitude of conflict.
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Table 4. Conflict decisions and demographics.
Conflict Amount Destroyed
Fear 0.52 0.57
(1 if Fear treatment) (0.36) (0.44)
Uncertainty 0.73 ** 0.81
(1 if Uncertainty treatment) (0.38) (0.59)
Incentive 2.31 *** 4.01 ***
(1 if Incentive treatment) (0.37) (0.62)
Male −0.34 −0.50
(1 if participant is male) (0.26) (0.47)
Age −0.13 * −0.19 **
(age of participant) (0.07) (0.09)
School Years 0.03 0.12
(years in college) (0.14) (0.21)
Business Econ −0.12 0.19
(1 if business or econ major) (0.41) (0.76)
Business Econ Classes 0.01 0.00
(number of business or econ classes) (0.03) (0.04)
Caucasian −0.40 −0.99 *
(1 if participant is Caucasian) (0.42) (0.59)
Religion −0.06 −0.27
(how religious is participant) (0.11) (0.22)
Christian −0.37 −0.05
(1 if participant is Christian) (0.28) (0.55)
Muslim 0.38 1.46
(1 if participant is Muslim) (0.52) (0.98)
Constant 1.49 4.83 **
(constant term) (1.39) (1.91)
Note: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Robust standard error of the mean is in the
parenthesis. When Conflict is a dependent variable, we use Probit regressions, and when Amount Destroyed is a
dependent variable, we use OLS regressions.
5. Conclusions
The current paper studies the three triggers of conflict from economics, social psychology, and
evolutionary biology, as well as the emotional reactions people experience from those triggers.
Consistent with the predictions, we find that conflict originates from all three triggers: economic
incentives, fear, and uncertainty. The most frequent conflicts occur when incentives are strong;
however, this is likely due to the fact that participants get to keep whatever they choose to destroy.
Perhaps a more surprising finding is that the three triggers differently impact the frequency of conflict,
but not the intensity. Also, we find that the frequency and intensity of conflict decrease positive
emotions and increase negative emotions, and that conflict impacts negative emotions more than
positive emotions.
Our findings have several implications for the disparate academic conversations about conflict.
To begin, our experiments suggest that different triggers of conflict may have different kick. In our
experiment, incentives mattered more than the other triggers—at least when it came to how often
conflict arose and how much resources in total were destroyed. Assuming that most conflicts involve
multiple triggers, the reduction of conflict in communities, organizations, governments, and nations
might not be accomplished without fundamental change in the incentives faced by potential enemies.
Our second contribution is to conflict process. While our focus was on the triggers of human
conflict, many other scholars are interested in its outcomes (e.g., [54]), generated emotions (e.g., [55])
and physiological effects (e.g., [56]). Our finding that incentives generate the highest frequency of
conflict in a reserve dictator game gives scholars, whose research is not trigger dependent, a fertile
paradigm for studying social phenomenon. Based on our results, it would seem if a scholar wants to
study natural conflict in controlled setting, manipulating incentives is the way to go.
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Finally, we contribute to a long-standing question of why some conflicts get out of control [57].
A potential answer is that intense conflicts decrease positive emotions and increase negative emotions.
Such emotional reactions may result in physical and psychological changes aggravating individual
behavior and leading to an even more severe conflict. We leave this question for future research.
An assumption of the current paper is that conflict and its elicited emotions are burdensome.
Should we relax the second assumption of our earlier definition of conflict, conflict and the emotions
that follow may have benefits. For example, work in economics and political science find that
conflicting parties can use costly threats to eventually stabilize relationships [58,59]. Therefore,
a question for future scholarship to address is what triggers are easier to recover from once
conflict begins?
In scholarship on affect, emotions can be used strategically [60]. For instance, expressing anger
can encourage concessions from opponents in a negotiation; but when given opportunity, those who
gave the concession will look for ways to get even [61]. Thus, future scholarship may benefit from
looking at how the emotions from triggered conflict change over time.
Future research may also consider the interplay among incentives, fear, and uncertainty as
possible triggers of conflict (i.e., what if both incentives and fear are present or fear and uncertainty).
Research should also focus on measuring sensitivity of conflict to the magnitude of incentives, fear
and uncertainty (i.e., what if incentives are higher or level of fear is lower).
Lastly, the three triggers of conflict studied here are not the only ones to consider. The want for
power is just one trigger that may warrant study. Agents can want power because of the monetary
incentives they may provide, but some agents can want power to achieve status. Power may be
particularly intriguing for future scholarship because while the want for power can trigger conflict,
the chance of losing it can also motivate individuals to go to great lengths to preserve their position.
Furthermore, considering that potential losses often loom larger than potential gains [62], future
research may ask whether wanting power generates the same amount and type of conflict compared
to wanting to preserve power.
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Appendix A
Instructions
Page 1
Welcome to this experiment at UC Irvine. Thank you for participating.
You are about to participate in a study of decision-making, and you will be paid for your
participation in cash, privately at the end of this session. What you earn depends on your decisions
and on the decisions of others.
Please turn off your cell phone.
The entire session consists of three parts. You will receive further instructions at the beginning of
each part.
All three parts will take place through the computer terminals. It is important that you do not
talk with any other participants during the session.
When you are ready, please click “Continue” to go to the instructions for part 1.
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Page 2
For this part of the experiment you will be asked to calculate the sum of five randomly generated
two-digit numbers. You will be given 10 min to calculate the correct sum for a series of these problems.
You cannot use a calculator to determine this sum; however, you are welcome to use the supplied
scratch paper. You submit an answer by clicking the submit button with your mouse. When you enter
an answer, the computer will immediately tell you whether your answer is correct or not and supply
another summation problem. I will give notice when 30 s remain.
If you correctly solve X problems within the 10 min, you will receive $10. To guarantee that you
receive $10 you have to try to solve as many problems as possible. Although you do not know the
exact required number X, we can tell you that it is a very reasonable number which you can achieve.
Please press “Continue” to begin part 1.
Page 3
In Part 2, everyone will be shown 5 pairs of paintings by two artists. You will be asked to choose
which painting in each pair you prefer. You will then be classified into one of two groups, based on
your choices.
The participants you are grouped with will be the same for the rest of the experiment.
After Part 2 has finished, we will give you instructions for the next part of the experiment.
Please press “Continue” to begin part 2.
Page 4
In Part 3, a participant from the KLEE group will be matched with a participant from the
KANDINSKY group.
One participant will be the SENDER and the other participant will be the RECEIVER.
First, the SENDER must decide whether or not to reduce the RECEIVER’s account total. Taking this
action costs the SENDER $1, and allows the SENDER to choose a reduction amount between $1 and $10.
If the SENDER does not take this action, there is no cost and there is no reduction in the RECEIVER’s
account total.
Then, the RECEIVER leaves feedback for a future group member who will be a SENDER in the
next session of this experiment.
There is no interaction between the SENDER and the RECEIVER beyond these two choices and
the choices are only made once.
Please press “Continue” to begin part 3.
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